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Federal immigration authorities have placed among their 
highest priorities the apprehension and expulsion of non-citizens 
convicted of one or more criminal offenses—so-called “criminal 
aliens.”  For the last twenty years, with varying levels of success, the 
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Executive branch has attempted to secure the cooperation in this 
endeavor of state and local governments and law enforcement 
officials across the country.  One key tool in the Executive branch’s 
toolkit has been the immigration detainer. 
The Executive branch uses immigration detainers to control 
the release of non-citizens from state prisons and local jails.  When 
federal immigration officials learn that a state or local law 
enforcement agency has custody of a non-citizen targeted for 
immigration proceedings or investigation, they issue a detainer to 
give notice to state or local officials that the federal government 
intends to take custody of the non-citizen upon release.  The form 
detainer notice issued by federal immigration officials directs the 
recipient that federal regulations require the recipient agency to 
detain the non-citizen for a brief period of time after the non-
citizen would otherwise be released from custody.1  Absent the 
ability to issue detainers, immigration enforcement officials would 
have to be present at the gates of the state or local detention facility 
to apprehend the non-citizen upon release. 
The Executive’s detainer practices have not yet attracted much 
scholarly attention.  I hope with this essay to begin a discussion of 
current detainer practices and their legality. 
I begin with the broad view, examining the recent history of 
immigration enforcement efforts targeting criminal aliens,2 and 
then focus more narrowly on the Executive’s current detainer 
practices.3  I then examine Congress’s grant of detainer authority to 
federal immigration officials and consider how the Executive 
branch has attempted to expand that authority by implementing 
regulations.4  After reviewing the actual authority for the issuance 
of immigration detainers, I conclude that the Executive branch has 
broadly exceeded its mission in the placing of detainers,5 which aim 
to transfer local, state, and federal prisoners to Department of 
Homeland Security6 (DHS) custody for “removal”7 proceedings.  
 1. A sample form detainer notice, Form I-247, is available on PACER.  Public 
Access to Court Electronic Records, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/uspci.html 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2008).  The sample was filed as an exhibit in Sattani v. United 
States.  Complaint at Ex. A, No. 3:05-CV-0655-H, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14196 (N.D. 
Tex. July 15, 2005) (No. 1). 
 2. See infra Part I. 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. See infra Part III. 
 5. See infra Part IV. 
 6. After passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 
116 Stat. 2135 (2003), the functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss1/13
  
166 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1 
 
Administrative regulations concerning detainers exceed the 
authority bestowed upon federal immigration authorities by 
Congress.  In closing, I briefly consider the various procedural 
avenues by which ICE’s abusive detainer practices may be 
challenged.8
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RECENT IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
EFFORTS TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS 
To understand how important detainers are in the current 
efforts to identify, apprehend, and deport criminal aliens, it is 
necessary to briefly trace the Executive’s recent history of targeting 
criminal aliens for deportation.  Deporting criminal aliens has been 
a priority since at least 1986,9 but the Executive branch has been 
largely unsuccessful in discharging this priority.  Non-cooperation 
between local and federal government agencies appears to be at 
the heart of this malfunction. 
Following the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act10 and the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,11 the INS (and later 
DHS) prioritized the apprehension of “criminal aliens” through a 
variety of enforcement programs.  The Alien Criminal 
Apprehension Program (ACAP) was implemented as a pilot project 
in four cities—Chicago, Miami, Los Angeles, and New York—in 
December 1986 to investigate, apprehend, and deport criminal 
aliens.12  With ACAP, the INS sought to remedy the failures of past 
(INS) were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security in March 2003.  
The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) assumed detention 
and removal operations. 
 7. Historically, proceedings to oust an unauthorized immigrant from the 
country were known as “deportation” proceedings.  This terminology was replaced 
in 1997, when the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act 
of 1996 (IIRIRA) took effect, and now all proceedings to expel immigrants from 
the country or prevent them from entering, are labeled “removal” proceedings.  
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (1996).  By replacing a word (“deport”) 
that requires a human object with another (“remove”) that is usually applied to an 
inanimate object, Congress opted for sanitizing language that embodies an 
attitude toward unauthorized migration fully consistent with rhetoric that 
describes unauthorized immigrants as “illegal.”  I indicate my dissatisfaction with 
this dehumanizing terminology by avoiding it where possible and by using 
quotation marks elsewhere to indicate it is not my terminology. 
 8. See infra Part V. 
 9. See infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. 
 10. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
 11. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986). 
 12. Criminal Aliens: INS Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on 
3
Lasch: Enforcing the Limits of the Executive's Authority to Issue Immigr
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
6 LASCH - KATE PROOFED.DOC  
2008] ENFORCING LIMITS ON AUTHORIZING DETAINERS 167 
 
programs under which the INS would not begin deportation 
proceedings against a criminal alien until after the alien was 
sentenced and delivered to prison.13  Under ACAP, the INS was 
called upon to work closely with state and local law enforcement 
officials to “help identify and process aliens involved in crimes at 
the earliest stages [presumably arrest and arraignment] of the 
criminal justice system.”14
ACAP also called for immigration judges to conduct 
proceedings for incarcerated aliens as expeditiously as possible “to 
ensure their immediate removal from the country upon their 
release.”15  In 1988, the INS launched its “Institutional Hearing 
Program” (IHP), a program later subsumed by the “Institutional 
Removal Program” (IRP).16  The objective of the IHP (and later the 
IRP) was to establish procedures “to complete the judicial and 
administrative review proceedings prior to completion of aliens’ 
sentences, thereby eliminating the need for further detention by 
the INS.”17  The IRP and ACAP were ultimately consolidated under 
the aegis of DHS’s “Criminal Alien Program.”18
Immigration, Refugees and International Law, 101st Cong. 7–8 (1989) (statement of 
Lowell Dodge, Director, Administration of Justice Issues, General Government 
Division), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d48t13/139869.pdf. 
 13. Id. at 5–6. 
 14. Id. at 8. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Criminal Aliens: INS' Efforts to Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens Continue 
to Need Improvement: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims, 106th 
Cong. 2 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 GAO Report] (statement of Norman J. Rabkin, 
Director, Administration of Justice Issues, General Government Division, U.S. 
General Accounting Office), available at http://ftp.fas.org/irp/gao/ggd-99-
047.htm. 
 17. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT DIV., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, , NO. 02-
41, AUDIT REPORT: IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE INSTITUTIONAL 
REMOVAL PROGRAM (2002) at 1, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/ 
reports/INS/a0241/final.pdf [hereinafter 2002 OIG AUDIT REPORT].  With the 
passage of IRCA, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
in 1986 to require the Attorney General to begin deportation proceedings for 
criminal aliens “as expeditiously as possible after the date of the conviction.”  Pub. 
L. No. 99-603, § 701, 100 Stat. 3359, 3345 (amending INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252).  
In the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Congress mandated that the Attorney General 
“provide for the initiation and, to the extent possible, the completion of 
deportation proceedings, and any administrative appeals thereof, in the case of 
any alien convicted of an aggravated felony before the alien’s release from 
incarceration for the underlying aggravated felony.”  Pub. L. No. 100-690, 
§ 7347(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4471 (adding INA § 242A, 8 U.S.C. § 1252a). 
 18. See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities: A 
Comprehensive Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens (March 28, 2008) 
[hereinafter Secure Communities], available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/ 
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The ambitious goals of the Executive’s programs for deporting 
“criminal aliens” were hardly realized, however.  Scathing criticism 
dogged the INS’s programs and revealed underlying state–federal 
tensions.19  The General Accounting Office, in 1997 and again in 
1999, criticized the ineffectiveness of the IHP/IRP and pointed to 
millions of dollars spent on detaining aliens for whom immigration 
proceedings were not concluded during their state prison 
sentences.20  An audit by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) in 
2002 likewise concluded “the INS ha[d] not effectively managed 
the IRP,”21 and suggested the blame lay in part on state–federal 
non-cooperation.22
The 2002 OIG audit, after noting past criticism of the INS’s 
management of the IRP,23 pointed out that Congress had 
broadened the universe of deportable criminal aliens24 such that 
“the county jails became a large source of potentially deportable 
candidates.”25  Yet the ability of the INS to apprise itself of the 
presence of criminal aliens in local jails was found to be “minimal 
at best,” and the Service’s monitoring of state prisons appeared to 
be in decline.26  Failures in administration of the IRP meant 
factsheets/ secure_communities.htm. 
 19. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-807, at 319 (2003) (“INS’s record in removing 
criminal aliens from the United States has also been uneven, at best.  GAO has 
identified criminal alien removal as ‘one of INS’s long-standing challenges.’  The 
INS’s experience with its Institutional Hearing Program is indicative of its 
inconsistent performance in identifying and removing criminal aliens.”); see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 105-636, at 35 (1998) (rejecting the Administration's proposal to 
expand the IRP, in light of the INS’s failure to meet program goals despite having 
received increased resources for the IRP; noting “less than 30 percent of eligible 
prisoners complete IRP processing before they leave prison, and an even smaller 
percentage actually are deported.”); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-479 (1999) 
(directing the INS to demonstrate to the Committees on Appropriations that the 
IRP gives “priority to aliens imprisoned for serious violent felonies or drug 
trafficking,” or “to explain why and to outline the steps [the INS] will take to focus 
IRP efforts on the most dangerous incarcerated aliens.”). 
 20. 1999 GAO Report, supra note 16. 
 21. 2002 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 17, at ii. 
 22. Id. at 7 (“The whole IRP process is predicated on the cooperation of the 
institutions in which criminal aliens are incarcerated.  Without that cooperation, 
the IRP cannot function effectively.”). 
 23. Id. at 4–5. 
 24. The report notes that in 1996, IIRIRA “greatly expanded” the definition 
of “aggravated felony,” making more aliens deportable on that basis.  Id. at 6; see 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208 § 321, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000)). 
 25. 2002 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 17, at 6. 
 26. Id. at 8, 13–14. 
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criminal aliens, whether in county jails or state prisons, were being 
released prior to processing by INS.27  The costs to the Service of 
incarcerating such aliens after their release from state custody were 
believed to be as high as $200 million annually.28
The 2002 OIG audit and a second OIG audit conducted in 
2007 provided some insight into the shortcomings of the IRP.29  
The 2002 audit reported that the IRP’s failings were partially 
attributable “to a lack of cooperation on the part of some state and 
local governments, despite the fact that they may receive substantial 
funding from the federal government in the form of State Criminal 
Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) grants.”30  (Since 1994, the 
federal government has issued SCAAP funds to reimburse states for 
the costs of incarcerating deportable aliens.31  SCAAP has been 
grossly underfunded, however, with states typically receiving less 
than a quarter of the compensation to which the program would 
entitle them.32) 
The 2002 OIG audit recommended explicitly conditioning 
SCAAP funding on state cooperation in enforcing federal 
immigration law.33  But SCAAP funds are payments, not grants,34 
and the OIG recognized this additional counterargument to its 
proposal: “SCAAP funds represent a reimbursement of costs borne 
by state and local governments to incarcerate illegal aliens due to 
the federal government’s failure to enforce its immigration laws, 
and therefore grant conditions would be inappropriate.”35  Efforts 
to enact legislation to expand the IRP by conditioning SCAAP 
payments on state cooperation with federal immigration 
enforcement efforts have failed,36 and SCAAP funding remains 
 27. Id. at 7. 
 28. Id. at 21. 
 29. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT DIV., 
COOPERATION OF SCAAP RECIPIENTS IN THE REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL ALIENS FROM THE 
UNITED STATES (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/OJP/ 
a0707/ final.pdf [hereinafter 2007 OIG AUDIT REPORT]. 
 30. 2002 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 17, at 17. 
 31. 2007 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 29, at i–ii. 
 32. Id. at ii–iii. 
 33. 2002 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 17, at 17–19. 
 34. 2007 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 2. 
 35. 2002 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 17, at 19. 
 36. E.g., H.R. 6789 § 911, 110th Cong. (2008) (proposing to expand the IRP 
to all states, and condition SCAAP payments on a state’s (1) cooperation with IRP 
officials; (2) expeditious and systematic identification of criminal aliens in state 
prisons and jails; and (3) prompt notification of criminal aliens to IRP officials); 
H.R. 4065 § 222, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 6306 § 621, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. 
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largely unconditional. 
The 2007 OIG audit, in addition to conducting a rough survey 
of a number of state and local jurisdictions, closely examined the 
level of cooperation between federal immigration officials and law 
enforcement officials in seven jurisdictions in states receiving 
SCAAP funds.37  Not surprisingly, the level of cooperation was 
found to vary widely from one jurisdiction to the next. 
At one extreme is the “sanctuary city,” the product of 
resistance on the local level to federal immigration enforcement 
policy.38  Reflecting the “deep ideological divisions” on the 
immigration issue, localities have adopted various policies and 
programs to “promote a self-conception as immigrant-friendly” 
even despite federal immigration policy.39  Of particular 
importance to the success or failure of the IRP, some cities have 
adopted policies or ordinances discouraging or limiting local 
participation in immigration enforcement.40  New Haven, 
Connecticut and San Francisco, California are leading examples of 
the “sanctuary city” concept.41  In the 2007 OIG audit, San 
Francisco was singled out as the single most non-cooperative 
jurisdiction of the seven visited: 
According to an agent working at ICE headquarters, the 
4437 § 223, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 37. 2007 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 9–10. 
 38. See Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 57, 60 (2007) (noting that “the evidence strongly suggests that the largest 
immigrant-receiving states, as well as some [other] states, are in fact consistently 
more generous to immigrants, even including undocumented ones, than is 
Congress”); Max Pfeffer, The Underpinnings of Immigration and the Limits of 
Immigration Policy, 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 83, 99–100 (2008) (“Because current 
national policies are ineffective and national immigration policy reform is absent, 
local policies that address immigration issues are likely to become more common 
and more important to effectively include immigrants in society.”). 
 39. Cristina Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 
106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 596–605 (2008). 
 40. Id. at 600–05. 
 41. Both cities have adopted municipal identification card programs that 
allow participation without regard for immigration status.  Jennifer Medina, New 
Haven Approves Program to Issue Illegal Immigrants IDs, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2007, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/05/nyregion/05haven.html; Jeff 
Holtz, This Summer’s Surprise Hit: An Elm City ID, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/16/nyregion/nyregionspecial2/ 
16peoplect.html; Javier Erik Olivera, S.F. to Issue ID Cards to Illegal Immigrants: City 
Becomes Only the Second in Nation after New Haven, Conn., SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 
Nov. 21, 2007, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/valley/ci_7522078.  The 
most recent Congressional bid to expand the IRP also includes a section entitled 
“ELIMINATING SANCTURY CITIES.”  H.R. 6789 § 921. 
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San Francisco County Jail and its administration appear to 
have implemented a “bare minimum of cooperation with 
ICE and the [Criminal Alien Program] to ensure they are 
compliant with state rules and the SCAAP regulations.”  
Agents employed by ICE are not permitted to access jail 
records without the authorization and approval of the 
Sheriff.  ICE agents are authorized to enter the jails to 
interview prisoners and to access the “all-jail alphabetical 
list” of inmates.  However, ICE agents do not have the 
authorization to access booking cards, housing cards or 
other jail records, including computers.42
At the other end of the spectrum is the state or local 
government that has partnered with the federal government by 
means of a “287(g) agreement” between local law enforcement 
agencies and ICE.43  These agreements are named after section 
287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act44 and authorize DHS 
to train local law enforcement officials in enforcement of the civil 
immigration laws.45  With such an agreement in place, local law 
enforcement officials can carry out the IRP directly.  Some ICE 
officials have suggested that SCAAP payments to states should be 
linked to local participation in 287(g) agreements.46
Most jurisdictions lie between the two extremes of the 
 42. 2007 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 10, 18–19 (describing ICE 
relationship with San Francisco Sheriff’s Department as “unfriendly and marked 
by ‘much animosity’”). 
 43. Section 287(g) was added as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 133, 110 Stat. 3009 
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2000)).  In the twelve years since, only sixty-three 
agreements have been put in place.  See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS, 
DELEGATION OF IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY, SECTION 287(G), IMMIGRATION AND 
NATIONALITY ACT (2008), http://www.ice.gov/partners/287g/Section287_g.htm 
[hereinafter DELEGATION OF IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY].  The program’s popularity, 
however, may be on the rise—the vast majority of 287(g) agreements came into 
being in 2007 or 2008.  Id. 
 44. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) 
(2006). 
 45. In 2006, DHS received $50 million in supplemental funding to pursue 
287(g) programs.  2007 State of the Union: President Bush's Plan for 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform, http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateofthe 
union/2007/initiatives/ immigration.html.  According to ICE, the number of 
287(g) programs is on the rise, having expanded from thirty-five to sixty-three 
already this year.  DELEGATION OF IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY, supra note 43.  The 
Administration reports it is proposing an increase in funding for 287(g) programs 
in 2009.  Immigration: Border Security and Immigration Reform, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/immigration/. 
 46. 2007 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 8. 
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sanctuary city and the 287(g) participant, and exhibit varying levels 
of cooperation with the federal IRP.  The 2007 OIG audit surveyed 
164 state and local jurisdictions receiving SCAAP funding.47  Some 
jurisdictions reported actively inquiring into an arrestee’s 
immigration status; a significant minority did not inquire.48  Most 
jurisdictions would, upon developing reason to believe an arrestee 
is undocumented, report that fact to ICE, though some 
jurisdictions would not.49  Most would not transport a prisoner to 
an ICE field office.50
These findings do not point to a single characteristic local 
response to the IRP.  OIG broadly reported that “many state, 
county, and local law enforcement agencies are unwilling to initiate 
immigration enforcement but have policies that suggest they are 
willing to cooperate with ICE when they arrest individuals on state 
or local charges and learn that those individuals may be criminal 
aliens.”51  Funding is obviously a significant factor—local law 
enforcement must “balance any decision to enforce immigration 
laws with their daily mission of protecting and serving diverse 
communities” by taking into account, among other factors, limited 
resources.52  Insufficient SCAAP funding might certainly cause state 
and local governments to be less than enthusiastic about 
cooperating more fully in the federal government’s immigration 
enforcement efforts.  In addition to underfunding SCAAP, the 
federal government has, at times, appeared uncommitted to the 
IRP by not responding to local law enforcement reports of criminal 
aliens.53  Several local jurisdictions cited federal non-responsiveness 
as a reason that the local jurisdiction did not cooperate more fully 
with the IRP.54
 47. Id. at 11.  Ninety-nine of the 164 jurisdictions surveyed responded to the 
survey.  Id. 
 48. Id. at 10–11.  Fifty-nine jurisdictions responded “Yes,” and thirty-four 
responded “No”.  Id. 
 49. Id. at 13–14.  Seventy-eight jurisdictions responded “Yes,” and only 
seventeen responded “No”.  Id. 
 50. Id. at 16–17.  Only twenty-three jurisdictions responded “Yes” they would 
transport, and seventy responded “No”.  Id. 
 51. Id. at 22–23; see id., app. at 66 (Major Cities Chiefs of Police Statement) 
(citing M.C.C. Immigration Committee Recommendations, June 2006). 
 52. Id. at 22. 
 53. See id. at 12–13. 
 54. Id. at 12.  One jurisdiction reported inquiring into an arrestee’s 
immigration status “[o]nly on domestic battery and felonies, because on other 
charges ICE does not respond . . . anymore.”  Id.; see id. at 14 (detailing responses 
indicating ICE’s frequent failure to pick up identified criminal aliens). 
9
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In March 2008, DHS unveiled its latest program targeting 
criminal aliens: “Secure Communities.”55  Although ICE touts an 
increase of state and local partnership as the “cornerstone” of the 
“Secure Communities” program, it appears that the real innovation 
of the program is an effort to increase information sharing between 
the FBI and DHS: 
Leveraging integration technology that shares law 
enforcement data between federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies, ICE is now able to expand 
coverage nationwide in a cost effective manner.  
Interoperability between the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (FBI’s) Integrated Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System (IAFIS) and DHS’ Automated 
Biometric Identification System (IDENT) will help ICE 
and local law enforcement officers positively identify 
criminal aliens in prisons and jails. 
. . . 
Currently, as part of the routine booking process, local 
officers submit an arrested person’s fingerprints through 
FBI databases to access that individual’s criminal history.  
With interoperability, those fingerprints will also 
automatically be checked against DHS databases to access 
immigration history information.  The automated process 
would also notify ICE when fingerprints match those of an 
immigration violator.  ICE officers would conduct follow 
up interviews and take appropriate action.56
Having failed, for some of the reasons mentioned above, to 
obtain more than ten percent coverage for the IRP in county jails 
across the country,57 it appears that ICE will rely on a technological 
solution that links the FBI and ICE biometric databases rather than 
on voluntary information sharing between state and federal 
authorities.58
II. DETAINERS IN PRACTICE 
Although the failures of the federal government’s Criminal 
Alien Program have been attributed to some extent to state–federal 
non-cooperation, one area in which there appears to have been 
 55. Secure Communities, supra note 18. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. 
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general cooperation between state and federal officials is in the 
processing of immigration detainers.59  The 2007 OIG survey 
“disclosed a widespread willingness to accept detainers from ICE,”60 
and to notify ICE before releasing undocumented aliens from 
custody.61  Officials in all seven of the local jurisdictions interviewed 
by the OIG indicated they accept ICE detainers and notify ICE 
before releasing undocumented aliens.62  ICE officials similarly 
reported compliance in the processing of detainers in those seven 
jurisdictions—even in San Francisco.63
To test the subjective reports of state and federal officials, the 
OIG reviewed the files of seventy-six criminal aliens discharged 
from state custody in the seven jurisdictions studied, and found 
overwhelming state compliance with federal immigration 
detainers.64  In every instance, state officials timely notified ICE that 
the alien was in custody and accepted an ICE detainer.65  In seventy 
cases, the alien was transferred to ICE custody upon release.66
Resistance by state officials to participate in federal 
immigration enforcement, then, is entirely absent where it 
concerns the receipt of immigration detainers and notification to 
ICE prior to release.  This is of critical importance for two reasons.  
First, state cooperation in processing detainers is the sine qua non 
for the Executive’s implementation of its Criminal Alien Program.  
Second, state nonresistance has allowed the Executive branch to far 
exceed its congressional authorization for issuing detainers. 
Detainers are, by and large, the key mechanism for 
implementing the federal Criminal Alien Program.  In many cases, 
 59. See 2007 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 15. 
 60. Id.  “Ninety-four of the 99 [jurisdictions responding] reported that they 
accept such detainers and the 3 that responded negatively added comments 
indicating that they may have misinterpreted the question as asking about the 
lodging of ICE prisoners.”  Id. 
 61. Id. at 15–16.  Seventy-eight of ninety-nine jurisdictions responding to the 
survey indicated they would notify ICE before releasing an undocumented alien 
from custody.  Id.  Of the jurisdictions that responded negatively to the survey 
question, it appears at least one would notify ICE if a detainer were placed on the 
alien.  Id. at 16 (noting negative response to question of notification, qualified 
with “unless ICE asks us to”). 
 62. Id. at 19. 
 63. Id. at 18–19. 
 64. See id. at 21. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id..  Of the six aliens not released to ICE custody, five were released to the 
custody of other jurisdictions, and the sixth was a Cuban who was paroled into the 
country in lieu of repatriation.  Id. 
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the absence of a functioning detainer process would mean criminal 
aliens would be released from state custody to freedom after 
serving their sentences.  Without detainers, then, ICE would be to a 
great extent back to square one with respect to apprehension and 
detention of criminal aliens.  There are certainly other mechanisms 
available to assist in implementing the federal apprehension of 
criminal aliens.  For example, 287(g) agreements permit local 
officials to make civil immigration arrests of criminal aliens upon 
their release and transport those aliens to ICE detention centers,67 
and thousands of criminal aliens have reportedly been identified in 
this way.68  In addition, under “inter-governmental service 
agreements” (IGSAs), local jails or prisons can be authorized to 
house prisoners on behalf of DHS.69  In some 350 IGSA facilities 
around the country, transfer of criminal aliens from state custody 
to DHS custody can be effectuated simply by lodging a form I-203 
(order to detain) indicating the transfer of custody.70  Yet, IGSA 
 67. Eleanor Stables, State, Local Police Slowly Warming to Immigration 
Enforcement, AM. RENAISSANCE, Nov. 7, 2007, available at http://www.amren.com/mt 
news/archives/2007/11/state_local_pol.php [hereinafter State, Local Police] 
(“[B]efore releasing inmates at the end of their sentence, 287(g)-authorized 
officers confirm inmates are illegal immigrants, issue them a court date, and 
ensure they are not released when their regular prison term ends.”); see also Carrie 
L. Arnold, Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement: State and Local Agreements to 
Enforce Federal Immigration Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 113, 127–29 (2007) (discussing 
287(g) agreements with local jails). 
 68. Arnold, supra note 67, at 129 (reporting that in the first eight months of a 
287(g) agreement, officials in Los Angeles County placed nearly 3,000 detainers 
on criminal aliens); see also State, Local Police, supra note 67 (reporting some 30,000 
criminal aliens were identified through 287(g) programs in FY 2006); Eleanor 
Stables, ICE Looks to Expand Program That Deports Criminal Illegal Immigrants, CQ 
POLITICS, Sept. 14, 2007, available at http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage. 
cfm?docID=hsnews-000002584744 (reporting 25,000 identifications in fiscal years 
2006 and 2007).  ICE credits the 287(g) program with “identifying more than 
70,000 (since January 2006) individuals, mostly in jails, who are suspected of being 
in the country illegally.” DELEGATION OF IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY, supra note 43. 
 69. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOCKED AWAY: IMMIGRATION DETAINEES IN JAILS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 10, Summary and Recommendations ch. I (1998), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports98/us-immig/Ins989-02.htm (finding, in 1998, that 
60 percent of immigration detainees were housed in local jails pursuant to IGSAs); 
see Aaron Terrazas, Immigration Enforcement in the United States, MIGRATION POLICY 
INSTITUTE, Oct. 2008, available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/ 
USFocus/display.cfm ?ID=697) (reporting IGSAs between DHS and over 350 state 
and local jails, housing some 65 percent of the detained alien population). 
 70. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE/DRO DETENTION 
STANDARD: ADMISSION AND RELEASE § V(E) (2008), available at http://www.ice.gov/ 
doclib/PBNDS/pdf/admission_and_release.pdf.  The process has been described 
as follows: 
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss1/13
  
176 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1 
 
facilities account for only slightly more than ten percent of the 
local jails and prisons around the country.71
If, in the future, DHS can in fact take advantage of 
technological improvements (“interoperability” with the FBI 
databases routinely consulted upon booking by local law 
enforcement officers across the country) to screen every arrest 
nationwide,72 then the cooperation of local law enforcement in the 
detection of criminal aliens will be rendered irrelevant.  The only 
need for local cooperation will be in the processing of detainers to 
allow DHS to apprehend and detain criminal aliens in state or local 
custody.73
The acquiescence of state and local officials to the detainer 
process is thus a prerequisite to the effectiveness of the federal 
Criminal Alien Program.  That state and local officials do not 
appear prepared to interpose any significant resistance to 
immigration detainers—in contrast to varying levels of 
“cooperation” demonstrated with respect to other areas of state–
federal interaction on immigration enforcement—is also important 
because it has given DHS carte blanche with respect to detainers.74  
Broadly speaking, what DHS requests, the states will deliver.  While 
this would ordinarily be consistent with the notion that the federal 
government has plenary power over immigration enforcement,75 it 
Lieutenant Robert Manley, who supervises intake and release at the Palm 
Beach County Sheriff's Office, explained the relationship between the 
federal government and the sheriff's office with respect to ICE holds.  
When subjects arrive at the jail, federal agents from ICE place in the jail 
record a form I-247, which is considered a detainer.  This document 
requires the recipient to detain an alien for forty-eight hours after the 
alien ceases to be in custody on state charges.  If a form I-203 is filed, and 
the alien has been released from state custody, the alien continues to be 
held and is considered to be in federal custody pending deportation 
proceedings.  At that time, the alien remains in jail as a federal detainee 
until ICE takes custody of the alien from the sheriff.  The jail receives 
monetary consideration pursuant to a contract with the federal 
government for holding federal prisoners, which consideration begins to 
run after the detainee is booked pursuant to the form I-203.
Ricketts v. Palm Beach County Sheriff, 985 So.2d 591, 592 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2008). 
 71. See Secure Communities, supra note 18 (reporting that there are about 3,100 
local jails around the country where criminal aliens might be found). 
 72. See id.  “ICE estimates that it may take up to two years to develop an 
automated process to search and prioritize leads from Interoperability based on 
the levels of criminality.”  Id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id; 2007 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 29, at 21. 
 75. See generally, Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 
13
Lasch: Enforcing the Limits of the Executive's Authority to Issue Immigr
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
6 LASCH - KATE PROOFED.DOC  
2008] ENFORCING LIMITS ON AUTHORIZING DETAINERS 177 
 
has troubling implications here where the Executive branch 
wrongly insists upon a “general authority . . . to detain any 
individual subject to exclusion or deportation proceedings.”76
Before examining the flaws in this legal position, it is 
important to see how DHS uses detainers in practice.  It appears 
the detainer practice is widespread and is rapidly expanding as ICE 
seeks to widen its Criminal Alien Program.77
A. Who initiates the detainer process? 
DHS describes the Criminal Alien Program as consisting of 
teams which “respond to local law enforcement agencies’ requests 
to determine the alienage of individuals arrested for crimes and 
other immigration violators as resources permit.”78  But it appears 
DHS initiates the placing of a detainer in certain instances, and is 
not limited solely to responding to local law enforcement agencies’ 
requests.79  ICE agents routinely “screen” state prison and local jail 
populations for criminal aliens80 in a manner that does not appear 
to be responsive to local law enforcement requests concerning 
specific individuals.81  Some agencies surveyed in the 2007 OIG 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 739–41 (2003) (discussing plenary power doctrine). 
 76. Enhancing the Enforcement Authority of Immigration Officers, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 42406-01 (Aug. 17, 1994) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 242 and 287). 
 77. See Secure Communities, supra note 18 (noting ICE Criminal Alien Program 
teams identified 67,000 more incarcerated criminal aliens in FY 2007 than in FY 
2006); see also Brandon Formby, Irving Thrust into U.S. Spotlight by Many ICE Arrests: 
Mayor Calls it “Example” for Others; Opponents See Racial Profiling, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, Oct. 12, 2007, available at  http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/ 
dws/dn/ latestnews/stories/101307dnmetirvspotlight.2d72e60.html (reporting 
“[a] recent spike in the number of detainers placed on Irving [Texas] arrestees” 
after local law enforcement began participating in ICE Criminal Alien Program); 
Brandon Formby & Scott Farwell, Opposing Groups Rally in Irving over Criminal Alien 
Program Deportations, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 14, 2007, available at 
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/101407d
nmetirvrally.168b5d56f.html (noting rise in ICE detainers nationwide, with 7,138 
detainers reported in October 2006 and 18,628 in August 2007); Michelle 
Pirraglia, Suffolk's Criminal Alien Program Nets Results, SUFFOLK LIFE, Feb. 7, 2007, 
available at  http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1781151/posts (reporting 
rise in aliens “handed over to ICE” from Suffolk County, New York—from 141 in 
2005, to 376 in 2006, and 42 in January 2007 alone). 
 78. See Secure Communities, supra note 18. 
 79. See id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See, e.g., State v. Reyes-Armenta, No. M2004-00419-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 
2804898, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004) (stating that “[t]he codefendants were 
then taken to the Sumner County Jail for processing. The officers had made no 
attempt to contact federal immigration officials; however, Agent Robert Kinghorn, 
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audit accordingly indicated they do not inform ICE when they 
believe they have an undocumented alien in custody, because “ICE 
agents come to the state or local institution to review files, which . . 
. obviate[s] the need to inform ICE.” 82
B. When are detainers placed? 
Given the Executive’s goal of identifying criminal aliens at the 
earliest possible stages of the criminal process and adjudicating 
immigration status before the expiration of a criminal alien’s state 
prison or jail sentence,83 it is not surprising that DHS’s practice 
appears to be to place a detainer as soon as DHS learns of a 
potentially deportable prisoner—in many cases before conviction, 
close in time to the alien’s arrest. 
Reported practices in Suffolk County, a jurisdiction that 
willingly cooperates with DHS’s Criminal Alien Program,84 are likely 
typical.85  Local law enforcement officials attempt to obtain 
immigration status information immediately after arrest and during 
an immigration officer, happened to be at the Sumner County jail and issued 
detainers on the defendants.”). 
 82. 2007 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 29, at vi.  An example of a jurisdiction 
in which detainers are not initiated by a request from local law enforcement is 
Yamhill County, Oregon.  Although ICE “asked [Yamhill County officials] to fax 
them every time a foreign-born person was booked in [the] jail,” Yamhill County 
declined the invitation, apparently because of a local policy which would prevent 
the sheriff’s office from notifying ICE.  Amanda Newman, Immigration and Law 
Enforcement: Who's Illegal?, NEWBURG GRAPHIC, Sept. 19, 2007, available at 
http://www.newberg graphic.com/news/NewsStory2.htm.  Nonetheless, ICE 
agents “routinely search inmate rosters throughout the country, running names 
and numbers against a database to identify possible illegal aliens” and, despite the 
absence of a request from local officials, visit the Yamhill County Jail “one or two 
days per week to conduct interviews and follow-up interviews as needed . . . .”  Id.  
ICE detainers were reported to have been placed on three inmates at the time of 
the article.  Id.; see also Lou Kilzer, Feds to Check City Jail List: Immigration Agency Will 
Look for Illegals Arrested in Denver, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 20, 2005, (reporting 
similar procedures in place in Denver, Colorado). 
 83. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 84. Pirraglia, Suffolk's Criminal Alien Program Nets Results, supra note 77. 
 85. Reported judicial decisions are not particularly likely to disclose detainer 
practices, but cases can certainly be found that indicate DHS’s practice of issuing 
detainers before conviction.  See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 853 N.E.2d 283, 285 (Ohio 
2006); Ricketts v. Palm Beach County Sheriff, 985 So.2d 591, 592 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2008); People v. Sanduvac, No. C149212, 2007 WL 3054372, at *5 n.4 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2007); In re Weems, No. M2006-00652-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 
2164150, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 6, 2007); City of Xenia v. Diaz, No. 2003-CA-
25, 2003 WL 22972039, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2003); People v. Gonzales, 
745 P.2d 263, 264 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987). 
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the booking process.86  After further investigation, local officials 
submit a list of names to ICE, which issues detainers, typically 
within hours or days before the alien has seen a judge or had bail 
set on the criminal charges.87
C. In what cases are detainers placed? 
It appears ICE lodges detainers indiscriminately, regardless of 
the criminal charges an alien is facing.88  ICE practices in Irving, 
Texas are emblematic of the current administration’s widespread 
use of its purported immigration detainer authority.  In September 
2006, local officials took up ICE’s invitation to participate in the 
Criminal Alien Program, and commenced a “24/7 Criminal Alien 
Program,” which permitted ICE to conduct “routine” telephone 
interviews with inmates of the local jail to determine their 
immigration status.89  Over a thirteen-month period, some 1,638 
immigration holds were placed in Irving.  The vast majority of these 
cases involved misdemeanor charges,90 and a significant number of 
the cases did not involve controlled substance offenses.91
D. When does ICE obtain custody of those held on detainers? 
Whether ICE routinely takes custody of aliens under detainer 
within the period set forth in regulations is a question that calls for 
further empirical study.  In Ochoa v. Bass,92 the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals discussed the issue.  The case involved two men 
 86. Michelle Pirraglia, Criminal Alien Program Launched, SUFFOLK LIFE, Nov. 22, 
2006. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Save for In re Weems, each of the cases cited in note 86, supra, involved a 
detainer placed on an alien not facing controlled substance charges.  This is 
significant because, as is discussed below, see Part IV, infra, statutory authority for 
immigration detainers is limited to cases involving controlled  substance arrests.  
See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 89. Sergio Chapa, Irving Illegal Immigrants' Charges are mostly Misdemeanors, AL 
DIA (Dallas), Oct. 11, 2007,  http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/ 
news/local news/stories/101107dnmetirvimmig.31ec7c4.html  
 90. Only nine percent of those held on detainers were charged with felonies.  
Id. 
 91. Over ten percent of the aliens held on detainers were arrested for driving 
without a license or with a suspended or invalid license, and over 16 percent were 
held for drunk driving or public intoxication.  Chapa, supra note 89.  Over 60 
percent were held for various misdemeanors, a group defined to include both 
drug offenses and non-drug offenses.  Id. 
 92. 181 P.3d 727 (Okla. Crim. App. 2008). 
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who appeared before state District Judge Jerry D. Bass on 
November 9, 2007, in separate criminal matters.  Judge Bass 
disposed of each criminal case by imposing a suspended sentence 
of imprisonment, but nonetheless remanded the men to the 
custody of the local sheriff “as being illegal aliens,” and directed 
the sheriff to contact immigration authorities.93  ICE filed detainers 
for the two men but failed to pick them up within the time limit 
imposed by regulations, and apparently never obtained custody.94  
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ordered the release of 
the two men on February 7, 2008, after some three months of 
illegal detention.95  The court ultimately held: “Once the forty-eight 
(48) hour period granted to ICE, by 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2007), for 
assumption of custody had lapsed without ICE taking any action on 
its detainers, the State no longer had authority to continue to hold 
Petitioners.”96
Aside from Ochoa, there is a dearth of reported cases 
concerning the time limits of section 287.7.  While it is tempting to 
speculate that this signifies ICE’s widespread compliance with those 
time limits,97 this may not be so, because in the typical case 
involving detention in excess of the 48-hour limit set by the 
regulation, an enforcement action will quickly be rendered moot 
and there will be no reported decision.98
 93. Id. at 729. 
 94. Id. at 730. 
 95. Id. at 734 n.14. 
 96. Id. at 733. 
 97. The 2007 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 29.  The report documents ICE’s 
timely assumption of custody of aliens under detainer and provides some evidence 
of ICE’s compliance with regulatory time limits.  Id. at 21–22. 
 98. Ochoa was an unusual case, in that the criminal judge initiated the 
immigration enforcement action—the judge directly ordered the sheriff to take 
the two aliens into custody and contact immigration.  Ochoa, 181 P.3d at 729–30.  
Even after ICE failed to take custody of the two men, the local sheriff acted out of 
a sense of duty to the local judge, “refus[ing] to release Petitioners due solely to 
Judge Bass's detention orders.”  Id. at 730. 
  A more usual case might have been presented had ICE issued detainers 
for the two men while their criminal charges were pending, and then failed to take 
custody of the men after Judge Bass ordered suspended sentences for the two 
men, thereby otherwise releasing them from state custody on the criminal matters.  
In such circumstances, filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus would likely 
produce one of two outcomes. 
  First, ICE might take custody promptly upon the filing of the petitions, if 
ICE were truly interested in pursuing immigration proceedings.  This is exactly 
what happened in Baez v. Hamilton County, Ohio, where the petitioner finished 
serving his state sentence on September 28, 2007, remained in the custody of the 
local sheriff pursuant to an ICE detainer, and filed a petition for writ of habeas 
17
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The tension that arises between state and federal officials with 
respect to detainers may be one reason the 48-hour rule is violated 
in practice.  Where state or local officials and federal immigration 
officers each have an interest in an alien, financial interests cause 
each agency to attempt to divest itself of custody over the alien.  
Federal immigration authorities, for example, have long sought to 
enhance the Institutional Hearing Program to provide for the 
completion of immigration proceedings before the alien ever leaves 
state or local custody.99  Meanwhile, state and local officials, who 
receive SCAAP reimbursements of pennies on the dollar for funds 
spent incarcerating immigration violators, will make every effort to 
arrange for the release of aliens to DHS.100  The contest between 
state and federal officials to see who can avoid paying detention 
costs for criminal aliens may well result in DHS not timely assuming 
custody over detainees.101  But whether detainers are being timely 
corpus on October 2, 2007.  No. 1:07cv821, 2008 WL 161240, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 
15, 2008).  He was released later that afternoon to the custody of ICE.  Id. 
  Second, ICE might decline custody, and the local sheriff (having no other 
authority than the immigration detainer for holding the men) would release the 
petitioners.  This may be what happened in Lopez-Santos v. State of Arkansas and 
Benton County Sheriff’s Department, where the petitioner sought release from the 
local jail, alleging he was being illegally detained on a putative ICE “hold.” Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus of Petitioner at 2, Lopez-Santos v. State of Arkansas, 
No. 5:08-CV-05030-JLH (W.D. Ark. 2008).  The district court dismissed the case 
because “the Petitioner does not appear to be detained in the Benton County 
Detention Center at this time.”  Order at 1, Lopez-Santos v. Arkansas, No. 5:08-CV-
05030-JLH (W.D. Ark. 2008).  While this might be another case where ICE 
assumed custody, it might also be that the local jail simply released the petitioner. 
  In either event the case would likely be dismissed as moot.  See Baez, 2008 
WL 161240, at *1, *4 (dismissing as moot); see also Lopez-Santos, Order at 1 
(dismissing as moot). 
 99. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
 100. One local sheriff said: “We don’t want them sitting in jail for a minor 
charge, waiting for their court date.” Pirraglia, Criminal Alien Program Launched, 
supra note 86. 
  The sheriff also noted that, once the accused goes before the judge, deals 
could be made to expedite the process even further,“Maybe the judge can give 
him time served, so we can get him out of our system immediately.” Setting low 
bail would also be another way to get illegals to ICE quickly.  “Once they post bail, 
and the feds have a detainer on him, we can call the feds immediately and hold 
onto the guy,” he noted.  Id. 
 101. The incentives may be complicated by other factors.  In Frederick County, 
Maryland, for example, there is a 287(g) agreement in place along with an 
Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) whereby immigration detainees are 
housed in the local detention facility.  Nicholas C. Stern, Sheriff updates county on 
ICE action, THE FREDERICK NEWS-POST, Oct. 17, 2008, available at http://www. 
fredericknewspost.com/sections/storyTools/print_story.htm?storyID=81545&cam
eFromSection=news The Sheriff reports it costs about $7 a day to house an 
18
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processed by DHS is a question ripe for empirical study. 
III. AUTHORITY TO ISSUE IMMIGRATION DETAINERS – ACTUAL AND 
IMAGINED 
Congress’s statutory grant of authority to issue detainers in 
immigration matters is closely linked to America’s “War on Drugs.”  
In a subtitle of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 titled the 
“Narcotics Traffickers Deportation Act,”102 Congress granted its 
only explicit authorization for immigration detainers.  The statute 
provides: 
Detainer of aliens for violation of controlled substances laws. 
In the case of an alien who is arrested by a Federal, State, 
or local law enforcement official for a violation of any law 
relating to controlled substances, if the official (or 
another official)— 
(1) has reason to believe that the alien may not have 
been lawfully admitted to the United States or 
otherwise is not lawfully present in the United States, 
(2) expeditiously informs an appropriate officer or 
employee of the Service authorized and designated 
by the Attorney General of the arrest and of facts 
concerning the status of the alien, and 
(3) requests the Service to determine promptly 
whether or not to issue a detainer to detain the alien,  
the officer or employee of the Service shall promptly 
determine whether or not to issue such a detainer. 
If such a detainer is issued and the alien is not otherwise 
detained by Federal, State, or local officials, the Attorney 
General shall effectively and expeditiously take custody of 
the alien.103
Curiously, the practice of the Executive branch issuing 
immigration detainers long predates Congress’s explicit grant of 
statutory authority.  In cases as far back as 1950, the subjects of INS 
detainers have raised questions concerning this restraint on 
liberty.104  The INS’s form detainer (Form I-247 “Immigration 
immigration detainee; under the IGSA, they get paid about $95 a day.  Id.  Thus, 
local immigration enforcement and detention is a profitable business—as 
described by the Sheriff, “the kind of thing we need in a tight economy.”  Id. 
 102. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1751(d), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207 (1986). 
 103. Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (2006).  
 104. E.g., Slavik v. Miller, 89 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa. 1950), aff'd 184 F.2d 575 
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Detainer–Notice of Action”) dates back at least to 1983, years 
before congressional authorization for immigration detainers.105  
The INS also appears to have engaged in the practice of simply 
serving a copy of the “Order to Show Cause”—then the charging 
document in an immigration proceeding—on the prison warden 
where the alleged undocumented immigrant was housed.106
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) of 1986 thus posed a 
problem for the INS—despite the Service’s longstanding assertion 
(through its practices) of a broad authority to issue detainers, the 
1986 Act seemed clearly to narrow any grant of detainer authority.  
The INS’s response was ultimately to promulgate regulations 
consistent with its historical practice, and far in excess of 
Congress’s authorization. 
Shortly after passage of the ADAA of 1986, the INS put in 
place interim regulations addressing the procedure for issuing 
detainers.  With these regulations, the INS purported to implement 
not only the ADAA’s provisions but also provisions of the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986.107  IRCA, 
however, did not specifically authorize the INS to issue detainers.  
Nonetheless, the INS proceeded from IRCA’s command “that the 
Attorney General must expeditiously commence deportation 
proceedings against an alien upon conviction of an offense for 
which he or she is rendered amenable to deportation from the 
United States,”108 and responded with regulations that authorized 
(3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 955 (1951); Chung Young Chew v. Boyd, 309 
F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1962); In re Lehder, 15 I. & N. Dec. 159 (BIA 1975).  The 
legality of immigration detainers as a general matter does not appear to have been 
decided. In Slavik and Chung Young Chew, the courts held, as a procedural matter, 
that individuals against whom an immigration detainer was placed while serving a 
state prison sentence were in the technical custody of INS.  Slavik, 89 F. Supp. at 
576; Chung Young Chew, 309 F.2d at 861.  Lehder presents the current prevailing 
view—before expiration of the criminal sentence under which an alien is held, 
immigration authorities do not have custody for purposes of a habeas corpus 
proceeding.  In re Lehder, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 161; see also Zolicoffer v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 315 F.3d 538 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 105. Immigration Forms, 54 Fed. Reg. 39336-02, 39337 (Sept. 26, 1989) (to be 
codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 299) (referring to Form I-247 with date of Mar. 1, 1983); 
Jonathan E. Stempel, Note, Custody Battle: The Force of U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service Detainers over Imprisoned Aliens, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 741, 742 
n.10 (1990/1991) (including a copy of the Form I-247 reproduced at Appendix A 
of the Note)). 
 106. E.g., Fernandez-Collado v. I.N.S., 644 F. Supp. 741, 742 (D. Conn. 1986); 
see Stempel, supra note 105, at 742 n.11. 
 107. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986). 
 108. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 52 Fed. Reg. 16370-01, 16371 
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the filing of detainers “against any alien amenable to proceedings 
under any provision of the law.”109
The regulations purportedly implementing IRCA were lodged 
in part 242 of title 8.  Meanwhile, in part 287, the INS placed 
regulations implementing the ADAA’s statutory detainer scheme.  
In contrast to the sweeping grant of detainer authority embodied 
in part 242’s regulations, those in part 287 more carefully tied the 
detainer authority to Congress’s grant of authority in the ADAA.110
In putting in place these interim regulations following the 
ADAA of 1986 and IRCA, the INS professed a desire to “ensure that 
Service operations are conducted in a manner consistent with the 
Congressional intent of both Acts.”111  Certainly, the regulations in 
part 242 track IRCA’s command to “expeditiously commence 
deportation proceedings against an alien upon conviction.”112  
Though finding detainer authority where none was granted, the 
authority embodied in the part 242 regulations could be reasonably 
read as limited to cases of convicted aliens.  Additionally, the 
regulations in part 287 hew closely to the ADAA.113  In short order, 
however, the differences between the two parts dissolved and the 
regulations came to embody the generally unbound detainer 
practice the INS had enjoyed before the ADAA. 
In the final version of the regulations, specific references to 
the enabling statutes were removed, and the language of the 
detainer regulations in part 242 was identical to that used in part 
287.114  The INS described the regulations of part 242 as a 
(May 5, 1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 242) (quoting Pub. L. No. 99-603,  
§ 701, 100 Stat. 3359, 3359 (1986)). 
 109. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(a)(2) (1987). 
 110. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(b)(1) (1987) (“In complying with the provisions of 
section 287(d)(3) of the Act, an officer of the Service shall not issue a detainer 
against an alien unless the alien is amenable to deportation proceedings under 
any provision of law at the time the detainer is issued.”). 
 111. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 52 Fed. Reg. 16370-01, 16370 
(May 5, 1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 242). 
 112. The regulations specified what would constitute a “conviction” and what 
would amount to “commenc[ing] [deportation] proceedings.” 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(g) 
(1987).  Additionally, the regulations specifically referred to IRCA’s amendments 
by referencing section 242(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  8 C.F.R.  
§ 242.2(a)(3) (1988). 
 113. The regulations defined the terms “arrested,” "law enforcement official 
(or another official)," and “controlled substance,” all of which are found in the 
ADAA.  8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1988).  The regulations also specifically referred to the 
ADAA by referencing section 287(d)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  8 
C.F.R. § 287.7(c) (1987). 
 114. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 53 Fed. Reg. 9281-01 (Mar. 22, 
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“codif[ication of] the authority of the Service to issue detainers.”115  
In 1994, responding to comments that the regulations went far 
beyond the limited statutory authority for issuing immigration 
detainers—that embodied in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986—the 
INS made clear that the regulations in parts 242 and 287 were 
meant to embody the general detainer practice of the pre-ADAA 
era: 
The commenters stated that the authority for issuance of 
detainers in §§ 242.2(a)(1) and 287.7(a)(1) of the 
proposed rule was overly broad because the authority to 
issue detainers is limited by section 287(d) of the Act to 
persons arrested for controlled substances offenses. This 
comment overlooked the general authority of the Service 
to detain any individual subject to exclusion or 
deportation proceedings.  See 8 U.S.C. 1225(b), 
1252(a)(1).  The detainer authority of these sections of the 
proposed rule were promulgated pursuant to this general 
authority.  The statutory provision cited by the commenters 
places special requirements on the Service regarding the 
detention of individuals arrested for controlled substance 
offenses, but does not delimit the general detainer 
authority of the Service.116
The INS thus rewrote history, ignoring the ancestry of the 
detainer regulations in parts 242 and 287—the ADAA and IRCA of 
1986.  Having eliminated any differences between the two parts, the 
INS removed part 242 in 1997 and reserved it for future use.117  Part 
287—originally tied to the ADAA—now stands as the sole set of 
regulations on detainers, and in the INS’s view codifies the pre-
ADAA “general detainer authority of the Service.”118
 
1988) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 242). 
 115. Id. at 9282. 
 116. Enhancing the Enforcement Authority of Immigration Officers, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 42,406, 42,411 (Aug. 17, 1994) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 242) (emphasis 
added). 
 117. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of 
Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312-
01 (Mar. 6, 1997) (to be codified in scattered sections of 8 C.F.R.). 
 118. Enhancing the Enforcement Authority of Immigration Officers, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 42406-01 (Aug. 17, 1994) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 242 and 287). 
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IV. DHS GROSSLY EXCEEDS THE LIMITS OF ITS AUTHORITY TO ISSUE 
DETAINERS 
DHS routinely exceeds Congress’s explicit grant of authority in 
two ways—by lodging immigration detainers without an initiating 
request from local law enforcement officials, and by placing 
detainers on persons who have not been arrested for controlled 
substance offenses.119
A. DHS exceeds Congress’s statutory grant of detainer authority by 
initiating the detainer process rather than waiting for local law enforcement 
officials to request a detainer. 
The plain language of the Narcotics Traffickers Deportation 
Act (NTDA)—that portion of the ADAA of 1986 in which Congress 
authorized the issuance of immigration detainers—requires the 
immigration detainer process to be initiated from outside DHS.  
The two necessary steps for the issuance of a detainer are: first, a 
“Federal, State, or local law enforcement official,” makes an arrest 
for a controlled substance offense; and second, “the official (or 
another official) . . . requests the Service to determine promptly 
whether or not to issue a detainer. . . .”120
 119. Further claims may arise with respect to the “48-hour” rule embodied in 
the regulation concerning detainers.  First, as noted above, it is not clear whether 
DHS regularly complies with the timing provisions of the detainer regulation.  
Second, the regulation may be infirm in that it allows for prolonged detention 
without a determination of probable cause.  Commentators have persuasively 
argued that regulations establishing procedures following warrantless arrests by 
the immigration authorities fail the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of prompt 
review to establish probable cause by a neutral examiner.  Shirley Huey et al., 
Administrative Comment – Indefinite Detention Without Probable Cause: A Comment on 
INS Interim Rule 8 C.F.R. § 287.3, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 397, 402–11 
(2000-01); but see Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02 CV 2307(JG), 2006 WL 1662663, at 
*46 (E.D.N.Y June 14, 2006) (“[T]he application of County of Riverside’s 48-hour 
rule to this context is certainly not clearly established”).  The regulations on 
detainers do not require DHS to establish probable cause before issuing a detainer.  
8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2002) (“Any authorized Service officer may at any time issue a 
Form I-247, Immigration Detainer-Notice of Action, to any other Federal, State, or 
local law enforcement agency.”); but see 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(c) (2002) (requiring state 
or local law enforcement agencies to provide documentation to DHS “[i]n order 
for the Service to accurately determine the propriety of issuing a detainer”).  The 
regulations allow for a period of 48 hours, not including weekends and holidays, 
before ICE must assume custody of an alien held by state or local officials.  8 
C.F.R. § 287.7(d).  The exclusion of weekends and holidays from the 48 hours for 
probable cause hearings was held presumptively unreasonable in County of 
Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991). 
 120. INA § 287(d) (2008), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (2006) (emphasis added). 
23
Lasch: Enforcing the Limits of the Executive's Authority to Issue Immigr
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
6 LASCH - KATE PROOFED.DOC  
2008] ENFORCING LIMITS ON AUTHORIZING DETAINERS 187 
 
The regulation, however, ignores the statutory language 
specifying how detainers are initiated, instead giving broad 
authority to DHS: “Any authorized Service officer may at any time 
issue a Form I-247, Immigration Detainer–Notice of Action, to any 
other Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency.”121
It might conceivably be argued that “authorized immigration 
officers” under the regulation enjoy statutory authority to initiate 
detainers because the statute allows detainers to be initiated not 
only by the arresting official, but also by “another official.”  This 
argument fails for three reasons. 
First, the phrase “another official” must be construed, under 
ordinary canons of statutory interpretation, to mean another 
official similar to the arresting official.  The principle of ejusdem 
generis means that “‘[w]here general words follow specific words in 
a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to 
embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated 
by the preceding specific words.’”122  To read “the official (or 
another official)” as broadly permitting any official to initiate the 
detainer process would require reading the words “another official” 
so broadly as to render the words “the official” surplusage.123  
Congress might as well have written the statute to allow “any 
official” to initiate the detainer process.  Instead, Congress likely 
recognized that as a practical matter it might make sense for a law 
enforcement official other than the arresting officer—another 
officer on the same police force, for example, or a booking officer 
at the local jail—to initiate the detainer process. 
Second, the structure of the NTDA makes clear that the 
“official” who must initiate the detainer request is outside DHS.  The 
 121. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2002). 
 122. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114–15 (2001) (quoting 
2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
§ 47.17 (1991)). 
 123. In Circuit City Stores, the Court considered section 1 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, which excludes from the Act’s coverage “contracts of employment 
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or 
interstate commerce.”  9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  The Court rejected a broad reading of 
the last clause: “Construing the residual phrase to exclude all employment 
contracts fails to give independent effect to the statute’s enumeration of the 
specific categories of workers which precedes it; there would be no need for 
Congress to use the phrases ‘seamen’ and ‘railroad employees’ if those same 
classes of workers were subsumed within the meaning of the ‘engaged in . . . 
commerce’ residual clause.” Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 114.  The same logic 
applies here. 
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss1/13
  
188 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1 
 
initiating official must “expeditiously inform[] an appropriate officer 
or employee of the Service authorized and designated by the Attorney 
General of the arrest and of facts concerning the status of the 
alien.”124  The distinction between federal, state and local law 
enforcement officials and officers or employees of the INS is 
maintained throughout the statute.  Congress clearly intended the 
initiation of detainers to begin with the arresting law enforcement 
agency. 
There are substantial reasons why Congress may have 
structured the NTDA to authorize state and local law enforcement 
agencies—and not DHS officers or employees—to initiate the 
detainer process. 
First, Congress may have allocated control over the initiation 
of immigration detainers to local law enforcement agencies to draw 
on those agencies’ expertise in criminal matters.  The NTDA was 
passed to further the “War on Drugs,” and it makes sense that 
Congress delegated enforcement priorities to the soldiers on the 
front lines—law enforcement officers making controlled substance 
arrests.  The NTDA grants discretion to law enforcement agents to 
request an immigration detainer, indicating a practical recognition 
that it is simply not possible to deport all non-citizens charged with 
drug offenses.  Law enforcement agents making drug arrests are in 
a better position than federal immigration officials to evaluate the 
seriousness of the criminal conduct and exercise sensible discretion 
as to which drug arrestees ought to be selected for immigration 
enforcement. 
Second, Congress may have given state and local officials the 
authority to initiate the detainer process as a matter of comity.  
Congress provided for reimbursement to states under SCAAP, 
recognizing the burdens on states caused by the federal 
government’s immigration enforcement failures.125  Similarly, 
Congress may have recognized that processing immigration 
detainers imposed a burden on the states, and accordingly left the 
decision to initiate detainers on state and local officials, to allow 
them some control over the burdens of participation in 
immigration enforcement. 
Third, Congress likely allocated the authority to initiate the 
detainer process to state and local officials because there is a 
 124. INA § 287(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 125. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.  See also H.R. REP. NO. 103-
645 (1994).  Of course, the NTDA predated Congress’s implementation of SCAAP. 
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substantial question—deserving of further study—as to whether 
Congress could lawfully authorize a federal administrative agency 
to unilaterally issue detainers for state prisoners. 
In federal criminal cases, the court may obtain the presence of 
a state prisoner in either of two ways—via the Interstate Agreement 
on Detainers (IAD),126 or by means of a writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum.127  The two procedures are quite different.128  The 
writ of habeas corpus commands the state custodian to immediately 
produce the prisoner in federal court, while a detainer merely 
serves as a “‘notification filed with the institution in which a 
prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face 
pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction.’”129  The IAD, 
however, additionally includes provisions intended to facilitate 
expeditious processing of detainers before expiration of a 
prisoner’s sentence. 
Neither procedure would ordinarily be available to an 
administrative agency such as DHS, and it is uncertain whether 
Congress could give DHS such power.  The IAD is an interstate 
compact to which Congress has, with its approval, lent the force of 
federal law,130 but which does not, by its terms, apply to DHS civil 
immigration proceedings.131  The IAD is a multi-jurisdictional 
agreement that requires the participating states to grant certain 
privileges to all other participants (such as the ability to obtain a 
prisoner’s presence for adjudication of a criminal case) in 
exchange for receiving reciprocal privileges from those other 
participants.132  Congress could not unilaterally grant to a single 
jurisdiction the powers vested in the IAD, and it is unlikely 
 126. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2. 
 127. See United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978) (discussing both 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers and writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum). 
 128. Id. at 358 (“The role and functioning of the ad prosequendum writ are 
rooted in history, and they bear little resemblance to the typical detainer which 
activates the provisions of the [Interstate] Agreement.”). 
 129. Id. at 359 (citation omitted). 
 130. See Leslie W. Abramson, The Interstate Agreement on Detainers: Narrowing its 
Availability and Applications, 21 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 5–6 
(1995). 
 131. See United States v. Gonzalez-Mendoza, 985 F.2d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir. 
1993) (holding that the IAD applies only to pending criminal charges in another 
jurisdiction and that “the courts have declined to treat deportation as a criminal 
proceeding”). 
 132. See Note, The Compact Clause and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 1958, 1969–71 (2007) (discussing the nature of interstate 
compacts). 
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Congress could unilaterally grant detainer power to DHS for the 
same reason.133
The power to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is 
bestowed upon the federal district courts by Congress.134  Whether 
Congress could bestow a like power upon an administrative agency 
is a question worthy of study.  By the language of the NTDA, 
however, it is apparent that Congress did not intend to give DHS 
the power to issue writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, but 
rather to give DHS the ability to secure the presence of an alien 
through a detainer similar to those employed in criminal matters 
under the IAD.  The state and local governments affected by DHS 
detainers have not, of course, joined a compact which would assure 
them mutual privileges and obligations.  Accordingly, Congress 
drafted the NTDA to require state and local law enforcement to 
consent to the placing of each detainer, by initiating the detainer 
process.135
DHS’s practice of screening jail and prison rosters and sua 
sponte issuing detainers, without the request of a local law 
enforcement agency, is contrary to the NTDA.  To the extent the 
detainer regulation purports to empower immigration officers to 
issue detainers “at any time,” without prompting by state or local 
officials,136 the regulation exceeds the authority granted by 
Congress. 
 133. To the extent a detainer serves as nothing more than notification of 
DHS’s desire to take custody of a state prisoner at the conclusion of her sentence, 
it does not appear to impinge upon the rights of the state.  But the regulations 
implementing the NTDA state that “for an alien not otherwise detained” by a local 
agency, “such agency shall maintain custody of the alien . . . in order to permit 
assumption of custody by the Department.”  8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2002) (emphasis 
added). 
 134. See generally Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611 (1961).  The Suspension 
Clause of the Constitution pertains not to the writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum, but rather to the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, which is the 
writ that tests the validity of a prisoner’s restraint.  Id. at 614–15. 
 135. In 2005, Representative Charles Norwood (R-Georgia) proposed an 
expansion of the IRP which would include authorization for state and local law- 
enforcement officers to “issue a detainer that would allow aliens who have served a 
State prison sentence to be detained by the State prison until personnel from U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement can take the alien into custody.”  H.R. 
REP. NO. 109-350 at 27 (2005) (proposed amendment to H.R. 4437 § 214).  It is 
noteworthy that Representative Norwood did not suggest DHS be authorized to 
issue a detainer binding upon state and local entities. 
 136. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2008). 
27
Lasch: Enforcing the Limits of the Executive's Authority to Issue Immigr
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
6 LASCH - KATE PROOFED.DOC  
2008] ENFORCING LIMITS ON AUTHORIZING DETAINERS 191 
 
 
B. DHS exceeds Congress’s statutory grant of detainer authority by placing 
detainers on individuals who have not been arrested for controlled substance 
offenses. 
Although DHS’s statutory grant of authority for issuing 
detainers is strictly limited to aliens arrested for controlled 
substance offenses, DHS routinely places detainers against aliens 
who were not arrested for controlled substance offenses.  It does so 
pursuant to regulations initially passed to implement the NTDA, 
but subsequently interpreted by the INS to have been a codification 
of a hitherto unspecified “general authority of the Service to detain 
any individual subject to exclusion or deportation proceedings.”137  
These regulations exceed the statutory authorization of Congress 
and are ultra vires. 
The notion that DHS’s “general authority” to detain supports 
an expansive power to issue detainers is fatally flawed.  Similar logic 
would lead to the conclusion that immigration judges have the 
power to issue writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, by virtue 
of their authority to adjudicate—but even federal district judges 
lack such authority absent a statutory grant by Congress.138  Similar 
logic would also lead to the conclusion that DHS has unlimited 
subpoena power, by virtue of its broad investigatory powers—yet it 
is clear that DHS’s subpoena power derives from Congress and not 
from any inherent investigatory powers.139  As with these other 
procedural mechanisms for compelling the presence of witnesses, 
the authority to issue detainers must flow from a statutory grant of 
authority.140
Were the Executive branch empowered to issue detainers 
pursuant to a “general authority” to detain, the NTDA’s explicit 
grant of authority to issue detainers for aliens arrested for 
 137. Enhancing the Enforcement Authority of Immigration Officers, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 42406-01 (Aug. 17, 1994) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 242, 287). 
 138. See United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 360 (1978). 
 139. See United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 183 (1956) (Congress’s grant of 
power to INS to subpoena “witnesses” did not extend to include respondents in 
denaturalization proceedings); Peters v. United States, 853 F.2d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 
1988) (stating “[t]he authority of an administrative agency to issue subpoenas for 
investigatory purposes is created solely by statute.”). 
 140. As is shown above, see supra note 134 and accompanying text, it is unlikely 
that Congress could have authorized DHS to exercise unilateral detainer power 
over the States. 
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controlled substance offenses would be superfluous.  Even 
assuming the correctness of the proposition that Congress granting 
the Executive branch “general authority” to detain also implicitly 
authorized the issuance of detainers to effectuate that “general 
authority,” that broad implicit authorization could not survive the 
NTDA, in which Congress granted a specific, narrow detainer 
authority.141
The decision by Congress to limit detainers to cases involving 
controlled substance offenses was a reasoned policy decision.  
Because Congress had not previously authorized the issuance of 
immigration detainers, it made sense for Congress to begin by 
granting limited authority.  Furthermore, given the scope of the 
criminal alien “problem,” and the limited resources available for 
immigration enforcement, it would have been appropriate for 
Congress to set priorities—and to attempt to limit the burden on 
state and local agencies that would be occasioned by an unlimited 
use of detainers.  It also was typical of the times that Congress—in 
the midst of a national “War on Drugs”—should have singled out 
drug offenders as the most appropriate targets of enforcement 
efforts. 
The Executive’s assertion of a broad authority to issue 
detainers, then, does not square with Congress’s limited statutory 
grant of authority, and is in fact inconsistent with Congress’s policy 
decisions.  Furthermore, the regulations do not appear to support 
the Executive’s assertion of authority. 
The argument that the present regulations authorizing 
detainers implement a “general authority” to detain is inconsistent 
with the history of the regulations.  There were no regulations 
authorizing the INS to issue immigration detainers prior to the 
 141. As the Court wrote in Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143 (2000): 
At the time a statute is enacted, it may have a range of plausible 
meanings.  Over time, however, subsequent acts can shape or focus those 
meanings.  The “classic judicial task of reconciling many laws enacted 
over time, and getting them to ‘make sense’ in combination, necessarily 
assumes that the implications of a statute may be altered by the 
implications of a later statute.”  United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 
(1988).  This is particularly so where the scope of the earlier statute is 
broad but the subsequent statutes more specifically address the topic at 
hand.  As we recognized recently in United States v. Estate of Romani, “a 
specific policy embodied in a later federal statute should control our 
construction of the [earlier] statute, even though it ha[s] not been 
expressly amended.”  523 U.S. 517, 530–531 (1998). 
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passage of the ADAA and IRCA in 1986.  Following those 
enactments, regulations were added authorizing the issuance of 
detainers—part 287 pursuant to ADAA, and part 242 pursuant to 
IRCA.142  The INS was quite clear that the regulations were meant 
to implement the ADAA and IRCA.143  Only after receiving 
comments complaining that the regulations went far beyond the 
statutory authorization did the Executive branch claim that those 
regulations specifically enacted to implement the NTDA were in 
fact enacted to implement the Executive’s “general authority” to 
detain.  The claim is disingenuous and completely devoid of 
historical support. 
DHS’s routine practice of placing detainers on persons not 
arrested for controlled substance offenses is unsupported by 
statutory authority.  Even if one assumes: (a) the validity of the 
regulations of the now withdrawn part 242, purporting to authorize 
detainers pursuant to IRCA’s command “that the Attorney General 
must expeditiously commence deportation proceedings against an 
alien upon conviction of an offense for which he or she is rendered 
amenable to deportation from the United States,”144 and (b) that 
those regulations were somehow incorporated in part 287 before 
they were withdrawn; such a scheme would only authorize the 
placing of a detainer “upon conviction”—whereas DHS commonly 
places detainers against persons who have yet to be convicted of 
anything. 
For all these reasons, the regulations authorizing detainers are 
ultra vires, and DHS’s detainer practices are unauthorized, except 
in cases of controlled substance arrests where the detainer process 
is initiated by the arresting officer or similar official. 
 142. Because Congress did not mention detainers in IRCA, the regulations in 
Part 242 were patently ultra vires.  Congress demonstrated in the ADAA of 1986 
that it knew how to grant the power to issue detainers when it wished to do so, and 
the absence of detainers from IRCA indicates Congress did not wish IRCA’s 
provisions to be enforced by means of detainers.  See, e.g., Lehman v. Nakshian, 
453 U.S. 156, 162 (1981) (“Section 15 contrasts with § 7(c) . . . which expressly 
provides for jury trials.  Congress accordingly demonstrated that it knew how to 
provide a statutory right to a jury trial when it wished to do so . . . .  But in § 15 it 
failed explicitly to do so.”).  At any rate, the regulations authorizing detainers 
pursuant to IRCA were later withdrawn.  See supra note 117 and accompanying 
text. 
 143. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 144. Documentary Requirements: Nonimmigrants, 52 Fed. Reg. 16370-01 (May 
5, 1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 212, 241, 224, 278) (quoting Pub. L. 99-603, 
Title VII, § 701 (1986)). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This essay seeks to inspire others to undertake further 
empirical and legal analysis of the Executive’s current detainer 
practices.  It is possible, however, despite the brevity of this 
investigation, to see there are serious flaws in the Executive’s 
argument that it possesses a broad general authority to issue 
immigration detainers.  Myriad legal strategies may be invoked to 
challenge the issuance of detainers beyond Congress’s 
authorization and the detention of individuals beyond the 48-hour 
period.  Such strategies might include:145 informal advocacy with 
state or federal officials;146 a motion to the local criminal court 
responsible for sentencing the non-citizen;147 a motion in 
immigration court to suppress evidence148 or terminate the 
proceedings,149 or to be released from mandatory no-bond 
 145. My list is not intended to be exhaustive. 
 146. For example, in Mahawa Conde’s case, Ms. Conde was serving a federal 
sentence and an immigration detainer had been lodged.  Advocates, including law 
student interns from the Yale Law School’s Jerome N. Frank Legal Services 
Organization, prevailed upon ICE to take into account the unique circumstances 
of the case, and ICE agreed to temporary release.  Ms. Conde was not taken into 
custody on the detainer.  Lucy Nalpathanchil, Yale Law Students Request Temporary 
Release of Pregnant Immigrant, (WNPR-Connecticut Public Radio May 5, 2008) 
available at http://www.cpbn.org/yale-law-students-request-temporary-release-
pregnant-immigrant; Danny Jacobs, Immigrant Mother Gets 3-Month Reprieve, THE  
DAILY NEWS (Baltimore), May 12, 2008. 
 147. A local judge who has just ordered the release of a defendant on bond, or 
sentenced a defendant to probation, for example, might well be receptive to the 
argument that an ICE detainer preventing execution of the judge’s order or 
sentence is invalid.  Just as the local judge’s order to detain the two men in Ochoa 
v. Bass was obeyed by the local sheriff, one can expect that a local judge’s order 
directing the release of an inmate notwithstanding an ICE detainer would be 
followed.  See 181 P.3d 727, 729. 
 148. See generally, I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) 
(holding that suppression of evidence is available in immigration proceedings 
where Fourth Amendment violations are “egregious” or “widespread”).  See also 
United States v. Fullerton, 187 F.3d 587, 590–92 (6th Cir. 1999) (remedy for 
violation of County of Riverside is either application of the exclusionary rule or a 
Bivens action), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1127 (2000); cf. Fernandez-Perez v. Gonzales, 
226 F.App’x 737, 739 (9th Cir. 2007) (denying suppression remedy for violation of 
48-hour rule of 8 C.F.R. section 287.7 where statements sought to be suppressed 
preceded rule violation).  Empirical study of DHS’s detainer practice is 
particularly important because “widespread” violations are a ground for 
suppression under Lopez-Mendoza.  See 468 U.S. at 1050. 
 149. See, e.g., Waldron v. I.N.S., 17 F.3d 511, 517–18 (2d Cir. 1994) (“When a 
regulation is promulgated to protect a fundamental right derived from the 
Constitution or a federal statute, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
fails to adhere to it, the challenged deportation proceeding is invalid.”); NATIONAL 
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detention;150 a petition for writ of habeas corpus;151 or a civil 
LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGR. LAW & CRIMES § 8:7 (2008) (suggesting violation of the 48-
hour rule of 8 C.F.R. section 287.7 would support termination). 
 150. The Immigration and Nationality Act requires DHS (with very limited 
exceptions) to hold without bond those who are placed in immigration 
proceedings who have been convicted of a “crime involving moral turpitude” for 
which a sentence of at least one year was imposed, multiple crimes involving moral 
turpitude, an “aggravated felony,” a controlled substance offense, or one of certain 
enumerated offenses involving firearms or implicating national security.  INA  
§ 226(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006).  To avail itself of the no-bond provisions of 
the INA, however, DHS must take an immigration respondent into custody “when 
the alien is released . . . .” INA § 226(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2006).  The 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has recently interpreted the “when released” 
provision as unconnected to the criminal offenses which form the basis for no-
bond detention; thus, an alien jailed briefly for an unpaid parking ticket may be 
subject to no-bond detention “when released” from jail, on the basis of a 
controlled substance offense occurring many years prior.  In re Saysana, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. 602 (BIA 2008).  The validity of this interpretation has been called into 
question, however.  The respondent in In re Saysana obtained habeas corpus relief, 
with the federal district court finding the Board’s interpretation erroneous and 
holding Saysana entitled to an individualized bond determination.  Saysana v. 
Gillen, No. 1:08-cv-11749-RGS (D. Mass. Dec. 1, 2008) (No. 17, Order on 
Petitioner’s Emergency Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus). 
  Importantly, In re Saysana suggests that mandatory no-bond detention 
pursuant to the “when released” provision may not be available to DHS if it is 
obtained by DHS unlawfully placing a detainer on the alien.  The BIA did note 
that “Congress could reasonably expect that many aliens falling within the ambit 
of section 236(c)(1) would be immediately taken into DHS custody through 
detainers or similar arrangements following their incarceration or arrest by State 
or Federal authorities.”  In re Saysana, at n.6.  The BIA, however, pointedly 
reserved the question whether the “when released” requirement for no-bond 
detention is satisfied “when an alien shows that an arrest was unlawful and the 
release from an unlawful detention has triggered the mandatory detention 
provisions of the Act.”  Id. at n.7.  It appears, therefore, that in cases where DHS 
obtains cusody of the respondent through a detainer and then invokes the 
mandatory no-bond detention provisions of INA § 226(c), the legality of the 
detainer may be challenged in immigration proceedings, or in federal habeas 
corpus proceedings such as took place in Saysana’s case.  See Saysana v. Gillen, at 3, 
n.3 (noting that “the BIA’s opinion gives no guidance as to the forum in which a 
person situated similarly to the petitioner would have the opportunity to litigate 
the lawfulness of his arrest.”). 
 151. The timing of a habeas action is a matter of some delicacy.  If brought 
before expiration of the state or local sentence, the existence of an immigration 
detainer does not necessarily serve to place the prisoner in the custody of DHS for 
purposes of habeas corpus.  See, e.g., Zolicoffer v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 315 F.3d 
538, 539–40 (5th Cir. 2003).  After expiration of the sentence, when the prisoner 
is held in state or local custody solely pursuant to the detainer, it would seem a 
habeas petition should be available to test the legality of the detainer.  See Perez-
Garcia v. Vill. of Mundelein, No. 04 C 7216, 2005 WL 991783, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 2005) 
(noting that after expiration of the criminal sentence, local officials are required to 
maintain custody of the alien pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d)), but there is a 
question of who the proper respondent would be.  See also Kendall v. I.N.S., 261 F. 
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damages action.152
In setting limits on the Executive’s authority to issue detainers, 
Congress expressed its enforcement priorities, and may have 
considered the burdens of widespread detainer practices on state 
prisons and local jails.  DHS, not content to limit its use of 
detainers to cases involving controlled substance arrests, has used 
detainers to implement an enforcement strategy broader than that 
shared by Congress, and is acting illegally in an attempt to achieve 
its own enforcement goals. 
 
Supp. 2d 296, 301 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“As the Second Circuit has indicated, the 
INS might have ‘technical custody’ prior to the assumption of physical custody, 
but only in cases where deportation proceedings have already resulted in 
‘determinations of deportability’ and the detainers ‘require [] the deportees to be 
turned over to INS custody for deportation . . . .’”) (citations omitted).  
Furthermore, if the petitioner is then actually transferred to DHS custody, a 
habeas petition based on the detainer may become moot.  Guzman v. Conn. Dept. 
of Corr., No. 3:03CV1532, 2005 WL 368038 (D. Conn. 2005); see Baez, supra note 
98. 
 152. See Comm’n for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County. v. County. Of 
Sonoma, No. 3:08-cv-04220-PJH (N.D. Cal.) (docket entry 1, Complaint, ¶¶ 67–68, 
76–81) (complaint for damages based on violation of INA section 287, 8 U.S.C. § 
1357 and injunctive relief and a declaration that 8 C.F.R. section 287.7 is ultra vires 
and invalid); see Fullerton, supra note 148 (suggesting Bivens damages action is 
remedy for County of Riverside violation). 
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